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It is a "bedrock" principle of our criminaljurisprudence,that the state
has the burden ofproving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt. A standardjuryinstructionto this effect is readoutto the prospective
jurors,priorto juryselectionprocess, hintedupon (to put it mildly) during
voir dire,and then againgiven to the selectedjurypanel at the close of all
the evidence in a trial.In Illinois,however, at no point is thephrase "proof
beyond a reasonabledoubt" ever defined In this state, it is assumed as a
matter of law, that the term "reasonabledoubt" does not need any
elaboration,and is therefore understoodby the factfinders. How did we
get to this point? This articlearguesthat a definitionof reasonabledoubt
is not only possible, but is a necessaryprerequisiteto restoringjustice in
our criminaljurisprudence.

E-mailandrelatedtechnology have createdmulti-faceted issuesfor public
employers andlegalpractitioners.The articleexamines the issue ofe-mail
communicationsfrom the perspectiveofpublic recordsandpublicmeeting
requirements of several midwestern states including the impact of
e-mail on public employee "privacy" in light of several recent cases
concerning the monitoringof employee e-mail Public employer liability
for misconduct in cyberspaceis likewise explored Publicemployees'rights
under the FirstandFourteenthAmendment to the UnitedStates Constitution
are examined as well. Finally, the article discusses the preservation of
privileges anddiscovery/litigationissues concerninge-mail.
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"When should a treatedrapist,child molester or other sexual offender,
convicted under a sexually violent predatorstatute, be releasedto society?"
This question isfraughtwith multiple levels of complexity in a tangled web
of misconceptions,fallacies,myths, andpitfalls reflected in the scientific
and legal literature.Several excellent scientificreviews have documented
tremendous progress in sexual recidivism research over the past few
decades. However, decision-makers (e.g., psychiatrists, psychologists,
social workers,judges,juries,districtattorneys,public defenders, parole
officers, and administratorsof both correctionalfacilitiesand hospitals)
remainconfrontedwith aplethoraof conceptual landmines andamorass
ofdifficult, perplexingnotions in risk assessment that may defy reduction
to comprehensibility. Towards untangling the tangledweb ofcomplexities
and misconceptions in this field, this article will clarify some of the
conceptualframeworks that may underlie common thought regarding
decisions to release sexual offenders and provide a briefsummary to
guide decision-makers who wish to utilize a therapeuticjurisprudential
approachin the evaluationof whether treatedindividualswho have been
previously convicted of sexual offenses shouldbe releasedto society.

One incorrectdecision reachedby the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals in
1998 has createda quagmireofcases over thepastfive years. In Ferguson
v. City ofPhoenix, the court decided thata plaintiffsuingunder Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA') had to prove intentional
discriminationin orderto recover compensatorydamages. This decision
resultedin an ongoingstruggle in the courts abouthow to define intentional
discrimination.But the strugglewas unnecessary.Title II of the ADA does
not requireintentionaldiscriminationand the courts never should have
appliedany analysis of the type of discriminationperpetuatedby Title II
defendants. This articlewillfirst setforth the backgroundand history of
the Fergusondecision. Next, it will examine thefalloutfrom that decision:
five years of cases that make clear how the Ninth Circuit erred in its
approachto Title II. Finally,this article will addressappropriatesolutions
to the problem created by the court when it requiredproofof intentional
discrimination before allowing recovery of compensatory damages in
Title II cases.
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This pragmaticarticle,thefirst exhaustive review of the issue,details how
lawyer advocatescan help homeless children have access to the education
to which they are legally entitled Topics discussedinclude: legal background
and authority,seeking alternativesto litigation,litigating,settling, after a
settlement is reachedor a decision occurs, and the future of homeless
education rights. Incorporating cases, personal interviews with the
attorneys who litigated the cases, settlements, complaints, motions and
other non-published court documents, state andfederal statutes, state
administrativecodes, federal and state constitutions, congressional
testimony, educational agency reports, law review articles, reports by
homeless advocacy groups, newspaper articles and more, the author
provides a beginning-to-endroadmapfor anyonefacingresistancefrom
ignorant or hostile school boards.

Victims of this childhoodsexual abuse suffer tremendous injuries,some of
which can carryon into adulthood Some of the injuries might not manifest
untilyears after the abuse has ended Adults often do not realize that the
psychologicalproblems that plague them day after day,year after year,
are a result of the abuse they suffered through as children. When victims
make this causal connection, some want to pursue civil damagesso that
the defendant can compensate themfor their injuries. Unfortunately,most
often the victims' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Some
jurisdictionsapply the discovery rule to toll these victims' claims, while
others do not. Illinois is one state that does not toll the statute of limitations
for victims of childhood sexual abuse who have always known of the
abuse, but did not make the causalconnection with their injuries and the
abuse until after the limitationsperiodhadpassed.By doing so, the courts
are denying these victims the compensation they deserve. Illinoisshould
take a more liberal stance in applying the discovery rule to such cases
becauseof the traumaticnatureof the misconductandthe unique natureof
the victims' injuries.
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Thirty-four students participatedin the Twenty-First Annual Northern
Illinois University College of Law Prize Moot Court Competition.Each
team ofstudents submitteda brief andparticipatedin at least two rounds
of oral arguments. The field of participantswas narrowed through the
quarter-finalandsemi-final rounds to two teams thatparticipatedin the
final arguments. The finalists for the oral argument portion of the
competition were; Meaghan Ring andC. Scott Brinkmanfor thepetitioner
and CharlotteLeClercq and Kory A. Atkinson for the respondent. These
students advanced to the Final Round based on brief scores and oral
scores from the semi-final arguments. The judges of the final argument
selected the winningteam anda "best oralist" basedsolely on oralscores.
The winning team was Meaghan Ring and C. Scott Brinkman. The "best
oralist" was C. Scott Brinkman. The briefs werejudged separately and
the bestpetitioner's briefand best respondent's briefarepublished in this
issue of the NOR TIERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW.

